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I. INTRODUCTION
Begun in the 1950s, the drafting of the Model Penal Code (the Code)
differed from the typical American Law Institute (ALI) “restatement” of
the law project because it was an explicit attempt to provide a model
statute that would advance doctrine and practice rather than merely
describe it.1 Scores of lawyers, judges, academics and policymakers
actively participated in the process of devising the Code. Their efforts paid
off. As Gerard Lynch wrote in 1998, “[t]he Model Penal Code is among
the most successful academic law reform projects ever attempted.”2 During
the 1960s and 1970s, well over half the states revamped their criminal
statutes to conform them more closely to the Code.3
*
Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School.
1. Herbert Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 465, 466–67 (1961) (“Unlike the Restatements, we are not attempting to articulate prevailing
law . . . we aim to build the source materials required for the reexamination and revision of our
penal codes that is so badly needed throughout the country.”).
2. Gerard E. Lynch, Towards a Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?): The Challenge of
the Special Part, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 297, 297 (1998).
3. Herbert Wechsler, Foreword to MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES: PART I §§ 6.01
to 7.09, at i, xi (1985).
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The Code’s most popular innovations were the liability rules found in
its so-called “general” provisions, which address overarching conduct and
mental state requirements, attempt and conspiracy rules, imputation
doctrines such as complicity, and the defenses.4 The Code’s definitions of
“specific” offenses were not as influential.5 But they too were innovative
and are still taught in American law schools as a coherent alternative to
existing federal and state provisions.6
The Code’s sentencing provisions, in contrast, were hardly novel for the
time and have received little academic attention. Those provisions adopted
a relatively indeterminate approach to sentencing that relied on a nonprioritized list of dispositional goals, sentences with wide ranges, and
release-decision-making by parole boards.7 Thus, the Model Penal Code’s
sentencing provisions came much closer to a restatement of practices
widely extant at the time than a fresh analytical look at how sentencing
should be carried out.8 More importantly, the wave of sentencing reform
that has taken place in the past three to four decades roundly rejected the
Code’s rehabilitative focus. Instead, the federal government and more than
twenty states have moved toward a more determinate sentencing
framework that limits judicial discretion, reduces or eliminates parole
board authority, and tends to place greater emphasis on sentences that
implement a just deserts philosophy in which efforts to reform prisoners
play a secondary role.9
Thus, in 1999 the ALI decided to revisit the sentencing provisions of
the Code and appointed Professor Gerard Lynch as Reporter for the
revision project, which was entitled Model Penal Code: Sentencing
(MPCS).10 In 2001, when Lynch joined the federal bench, Professor Kevin
Reitz became the Reporter for the MPCS.11 Reitz has since carried out the
gargantuan task of drafting black letter revisions and commentary,
providing research materials to the ALI’s various consulting groups, and
shepherding the revisions through the complicated ALI vetting process.
4. Lynch, supra note 2, at 297–98.
5. Id. at 299–300.
6. Most criminal law casebooks set out both the general and special parts of the Model
Penal Code and include problems that require delving into the latter. See, e.g., MARKUS D. DUBBER
& MARK G. KELMAN, AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES AND COMMENTS A-55 to A-90
(2d ed. 2009); PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES 1118–57 (2d
ed. 2008).
7. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.10 (1962).
8. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum xxviii–xxix
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
9. Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved
Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1202–03 (2005).
10. Lance Liebman, MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT, Foreward i, xi–xii (2003).
11. Id. at xii.
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The revision process to date can be divided into three stages: (1)
preliminary conceptual work by Professor Reitz; (2) the adoption of
Tentative Draft No. 1 by the ALI; and (3) the drafting of Tentative Draft
No. 2 (also called the Council Draft in this article). After discussing these
three stages, this article summarizes the six articles that follow, each of
which provides a unique glimpse into the substance and rationale of the
MPCS project.
II. PRELIMINARY STEPS IN THE MPCS PROCESS
The prospectus prepared by Professor Reitz in 2001 when he began as
MPCS Reporter laid out an ambitious agenda, organized under three
categories: sentencing structure, substantive sentencing policy, and
sentencing process.12 The primary structural issue he identified was the
proper assignment of sentencing authority.13 The drafters of the original
Code assumed that risk assessment and rehabilitation could be carried out
fairly effectively, and thus left the ultimate duration and nature of
sentences largely up to parole boards.14 But, according to Reitz, “[t]he
research consensus today is that . . . the aggregate crime-reduction returns
from [rehabilitative] programs have been disappointing.”15 Furthermore,
“no one has mounted a persuasive defense of rehabilitation theory
sufficient to reinstate it as the dominant purpose of criminal penalties, nor
has anyone produced a serious defense of the distribution of sentencing
authorities within indeterminate structures.”16
Thus, Reitz suggested that the ALI consider adoption of the
“guidelines” approach that has been at the center of most reform proposals
over the past several decades.17 Although numerous types of guidelines
systems exist, all are the product of deliberations by sentencing
commissions and consist of sentencing ranges for each offense that,
compared to the usual indeterminate sentencing system, are meant to
provide more direction to judges at the front-end and diminish the role of
parole boards at the back-end. The possible advantages of such a system,
Reitz noted, include greater predictability and fairness in sentencing
outcomes and increased transparency in the disposition decision-making
process.18 Moreover, such systems can enhance control over the costs and
12. Kevin R. Reitz, A Proposal for Revision of the Sentencing Articles of the Model Penal
Code (Working Draft 2001).
13. Id. at 2–3.
14. Id. at 3–4.
15. Id. at 4.
16. Id. at 5.
17. Id. at 10.
18. Id. at 5–6 (recounting commentators’ arguments that indeterminate sentencing is deficient
in achieving either of these goals).
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use of imprisonment because of the sentencing commission’s access to and
expertise in evaluating system-wide data and the greater ease with which
forecasts about prison populations can be made when sentences must
adhere to statewide criteria.19 Anticipating some negative reaction to the
guidelines idea from those familiar with the federal system,20 Reitz also
cautioned that the various flaws in that much-maligned guidelines
regime—which is based almost entirely on retributive principles, is
relatively inflexible, and micro-manages the sentencing decision through a
large number of variables—are not necessarily replicated in most state
guidelines systems, which often provide greater discretion to judges and
contemplate that multiple purposes can be implemented through
sentencing.21
Consistent with the latter observation, Reitz’s discussion of possible
approaches to substantive sentencing policy—his second general reform
category—did not reject rehabilitation out-of-hand.22 Reitz noted that, in
contrast to the federal system, many states guidelines systems have relied
on a “mixed formula of utilitarian and moral purposes,” albeit a formula
that usually uses desert to set the lower and upper penalty limits.23 Reitz
also proposed that the ALI consider a number of other substantive
innovations that the original Code did not mention, including: mechanisms
for reducing prison growth; the adoption of procedures for obtaining
information about minority sentencing; the expanded use of “intermediate
sanctions” such as community residential facilities, victim restitution,
criminal forfeiture, home confinement with electronic monitoring, and
“shaming” sanctions; and restorative justice principles that provide more
of a role for the victim in the dispositional process.24
The final area of potential reform Reitz identified in his prospectus was
the sentencing process.25 Here he primarily had in mind the difficult
question of when a fact that affects a sentence must be decided at trial by a
jury rather than at sentencing by a judge.26 The drafters of the original
Code were unconcerned about the issue, probably because they felt facts
considered at sentencing would usually redound to the defendant’s benefit
or at least be considered within a paternalistic, rehabilitative paradigm.27
19. Id. at 7–8.
20. For one criticism of the federal guidelines system, see Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity:
The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85
(2005).
21. Reitz, supra note 12, at 9–10.
22. Id. at 11–19.
23. Id. at 15.
24. See id. at 11–19.
25. Id. at 19.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 20–21.
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But in recent years the Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey,28
Blakely v. Washington,29 and United States v. Booker,30 which together
upend this aspect of sentencing by establishing that, under the Sixth
Amendment, all facts enhancing a sentence beyond a mandatory guideline
maximum must be found by a jury. Writing after Apprendi but before
Blakely and Booker, Reitz suggested that a new Code could build upon the
old Code’s crime definitions to distinguish between “material” trial facts
(decided by a jury) and trial facts that can be left to sentencing (by the
judge).31 Although Blakely and Booker now require a somewhat different
analysis,32 considerable room remains for experimentation.33
A Report authored by Reitz on the status of the MPCS issued two years
into the project echoed many of the themes in his prospectus.34 A
particularly useful elaboration of his criticism of the original Code’s
approach is the Report’s comparison of indeterminate sentencing with
commission-guidelines sentencing in terms of the proportion of sentence
controlled by front-end decision-makers (legislatures, commissions and
judges) and back-end decision-makers (correctional officials and parole
boards). According to the Report, back-end decision-makers are typically
responsible for between seventy-five percent and eighty-five percent of the
sentence in indeterminate regimes but only about fifteen percent of the
sentence in guidelines regimes.35 The Report expressed a strong preference
for the latter type of regime because it imports the rule of law into
sentencing, enhances the ability to implement and monitor systemic
reforms and manage resources, and diminishes disparate and biased
sentences.36 However, the Report, like the prospectus, cautioned against
relying on the federal guidelines model, given its severe limits on judicial
discretion, its complexity and rigidity, its failure to encourage alternative
sanctions, and its tendency to ignore or be agnostic about issues of
resource management, racial bias, and sentencing philosophy.37

28. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
29. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
30. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
31. Reitz, supra note 12, at 23.
32. All facts, not just “material” ones, must be found by a jury if they enhance a sentence
beyond the guidelines maximum, unless the maximum is “advisory.” See Booker, 543 U.S. at 233–
34.
33. See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, Beyond Band-Aids: A Proposal for Reconfiguring
Federal Sentencing After Booker, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 149, 186–215 (describing possible
responses to Blakely and Booker).
34. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT (2003).
35. Compare id. at 21–26 (illustrating indeterminate sentencing), with id. at 59–63
(illustrating determinate sentencing).
36. Id. at 49, 63–115.
37. Id. at 115–25.
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III. TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 1
Despite the Blakely/Booker revolution, the ALI has made significant
progress on the MPCS project since Reitz’s 2003 Report.38 Tentative Draft
No. 1, dealing with sentencing goals, sentencing commissions, and the
sentencing process, was approved by the membership of the ALI in May,
2007.39 And since September 2008, a preliminary version of Tentative
Draft No. 2, which focuses on the details of sentencing structure, has been
under serious consideration by the ALI Council, preparatory to its
submission to the full ALI membership.40
Probably the most important aspect of Tentative Draft No. 1 is its
revision of the original Code’s § 1.02 regarding the purposes of the Code.41
Whereas the old Code had specified a wide array of objectives to be
achieved through crime definition and punishment, with no clear
enunciation of whether or when particular goals should predominate,42 the
new provision adopts Norval Morris’ concept of “limiting retributivism.”43
As the commentary to the provision explains, this principle posits that
“utilitarian goals such as rehabilitation, incapacitation, general deterrence,
and victim and community restoration should not be allowed to produce
sentences more or less severe than those deserved by offenders on moral
grounds.”44 In other words, under the MPCS retributive considerations—
the relative “gravity” of the offense, harm done to the victim, and
“blameworthiness” of the offender45—are to dictate the potential range of
the sentence. Only within this range may considerations about the
offender’s dangerousness and treatability or the type of message the public
should receive influence the sentencing decision. The new purposes
provision also displays its cautious stance toward these and other utilitarian
objectives by stipulating that they may affect a sentence only when
achieving them is “reasonably feasible.”46 Thus, compared to the old Code,
Tentative Draft No. 1 gives desert a much more conspicuous role in
38. Kevin R. Reitz, Demographic Impact Statements, O’Connor’s Warning, and the
Mysteries of Prison Release: Topics from a Sentencing Reform Agenda, 61 FLA. L. REV. 683
(2009).
39. Id. at 689.
40. Id.
41. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2), at 1–2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
42. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2) (1962).
43. See NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); see also Richard S. Frase,
Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, in 22 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH
(Michael Tonry ed. 1997).
44. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) illus., at 4–5 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
45. Id. § 1.02(2), at 1. Section 1.02(2)(a)(i) uses these terms to operationalize “retribution.”
Id. at 31. It avoids the latter term because it has become “ideologically charged” and associated
with the growth of imprisonment in recent years. Id.
46. Id. § 1.02(2)(a)(ii), at 1.
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fashioning criminal sentences. It eschews the type of open-ended
sentencing that some jurisdictions adopted to facilitate flexible
implementation of individual prevention goals.
At the same time, Tentative Draft No. 1 rejects not only the view that
desert should be the sole determinant of disposition,47 but also the notion
of some desert theorists that there is a single correct retributive punishment
for each offender.48 Instead, it adopts Morris’ assumption that we do not
have adequate “moral calipers” to reach such definitive conclusions and
that, at best, we can merely ascertain when a punishment is clearly
excessive or insufficient on desert grounds.49 The result of this reasoning is
a statement of purpose that represents an innovative compromise between
deontological and consequentialist principles unique among sentencing
codes in this country.
The new section contains a number of other interesting provisions.
First, telegraphing a hostile stance toward the legislative tendency to
increase sentence lengths after every moral panic, it calls for “sentences no
more severe than necessary” to achieve the stated purposes of
punishment,50 a declaration that the commentary calls the “parsimony”
principle.51 Second, the section requires uniformity with respect to all
sentencing goals, not just desert.52 Thus, some attempt apparently must be
made not just to treat all robberies alike, but all robbers with a particular
risk profile alike. Third, consistent with Reitz’s prospectus, it states that
sentencing policy must be designed to reduce racial and ethnic disparities,
encourage intermediate penalties, and “promote research on sentencing
policy and practices,”53 so that, as the commentary to the provision puts it,
sentencing will be “evidence-based.”54
The next several provisions of Tentative Draft No. 1 are devoted to
outlining the role of the sentencing Commission. Under the Draft the
Commission would be permanent, rather than the temporary entity it has
been in states that established commissions simply to create guidelines and
then disbanded them.55 The Commission would also be sizeable, ranging
47. See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 51 (1976).
48. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law
and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 34 (“[O]nce a society sets the endpoint of its punishment
continuum [according to desert], the ordinal ranking of cases along that continuum will produce
quite specific punishments.”).
49. Norval Morris & Marc Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness, in 6 CRIME AND JUSTICE:
AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 37 (1985).
50. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(iii), at 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
51. Id. at 13.
52. Id. § 1.02(2)(b)(ii), at 2.
53. Id. § 1.02(2)(b)(iii)–(vii), at 2.
54. Id. at 21.
55. Id. § 6A.01, at 46 (establishing permanent Commission). The commentary notes that “[a]

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 1

672

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

between eleven and twenty-two members,56 and diverse, in that it would
include judges, legislators, prosecutors, defense attorneys, correctional
authorities and members of the public.57
Finally, the Commission would have three prominent jobs. First, it
would be charged with developing sentencing guidelines that ensure,
consistent with § 1.02 (but largely contrary to the federal system), that
judges retain considerable discretion in meting out sentences within desertbound ranges.58 Second, during its first two years or so the Commission
would be required to carry out detailed research about a host of issues
relating to sentencing (including the resource and race issues already
mentioned) to ensure that its development of the guidelines is based on
sound information.59 Third, it would have an ongoing responsibility to
review the efficacy of the sentencing regime, to keep statistics that assist in
developing rational sentencing policy, and to make recommendations to
the legislature consistent with that policy.60
Tentative Draft No. 1 then describes in more detail the contours of the
Commission’s first job, the development of sentencing guidelines.
Consistent with § 1.02, it calls for “presumptive guidelines” that may not
exceed the range dictated by desert but that can be further refined within
those limits by reference to realistic utilitarian goals.61 Thus, for instance,
the Commission could adopt a presumptive maximum sentence lower than
one that would be required by retributive analysis (although not one that
would be too lenient under that analysis) for any class of drug offender that
research shows is particularly amenable to substance abuse treatment.62
Furthermore, Tentative Draft No. 1 expresses no preference for any
number of states have elected to create temporary sentencing commissions, or have abolished
standing commissions at some point after the commission’s guidelines have taken effect.” Id. at 48.
56. Id. § 6A.02, at 58–61. This provision sets out two options, one of which would establish
an eleven-member Commission and one of which would establish a twenty-two-member
Commission. Id. The commentary states that, since “[n]o one formula for a commission’s
composition has proven superior,” the MPCS merely sets out possible options. Id. at 62.
57. See id. § 6A.02, at 58–61 (listing types of individuals who should be on the Commission).
58. Id. § 6A.04(1), at 90 (requiring development of guidelines); id. § 6B.03(4), at 178
(noting,“[t]he guidelines should invite sentencing courts to individualize sentencing decisions in
light of the purposes in § 1.02(2)(a), and the guidelines may not foreclose the individualization of
sentences in light of those considerations”).
59. Id. § 6A.04, at 90 (setting out “initial responsibilities” of the Commission).
60. Id. § 6A.05, at 99–103 (setting out “ongoing responsibilities” of the Commission); id.
§ 6A.09, at 147 (requiring “omnibus review of [the] sentencing system . . . [e]very [ten] years”).
Section 6A.06 also calls for the development of a “community corrections strategy,” which can be
carried out either as part of the Commission’s initial responsibilities or at some later point in time.
Id. § 6A.06, at 129–30.
61. Id. § 6B.02(1), at 159–60 (requiring development of presumptive guidelines); id. § 6B.03,
at 177 (requiring that presumptive guidelines conform to the purposes of punishment in § 1.02(2)).
62. See id. § 6B.03 illus. 1, at 181.
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particular utilitarian goal, so long as its effect does not exceed the desertbased range. Thus, the commentary states:
[A] commission might promulgate a guideline stating that, for
serious violent offenses, the primary purposes to be weighed
by sentencing courts should be retribution and incapacitation
of the offender. Another guideline might provide that, for
certain kinds of property crime, the leading considerations
ought to be restitution to the crime victim and specific
deterrence of the offender through the application of
economic sanctions. For categories of cases at the lowest end
of the gravity scale, the guidelines may direct the courts
chiefly to restorative sentences that address the needs of
victims, offenders, and their communities.63
Tentative Draft No. 1 also contemplates that the presumptive guidelines
will consist of relatively narrow ranges, a stipulation meant to promote
consistency, enhance perceptions of fairness, and facilitate predictability
about prison populations.64 However, the Draft also emphasizes that
sentences in particular cases are ultimately to be fashioned by judges, who
have authority to depart from the presumptive range, limited only by
appellate review.65 Thus, while the Commission is charged with
developing a list of aggravating and mitigating factors that support such
departures, its list is non-exclusive and may not ascribe a particular
duration to any aggravators or mitigators.66 Further, whether they come
from the Commission or the courts, departure factors can derive from
either retributive or utilitarian principles and target virtually any
characteristic or conduct of the defendant, subject to four caveats. First,
race, gender, creed, national origin, and the like generally may not be
considered.67 Second, in order to conform to Blakely, all aggravators that
63. Id. at 183.
64. Id. § 6B.04(3), at 192 (“Ranges of incarceration terms should be sufficiently narrow to
express meaningful distinctions across categories of cases on grounds of proportionality, to promote
reasonable uniformity in sentences imposed and served, and to facilitate reliable projections of
correctional populations using the correctional-population forecasting model in § 6A.07.”).
65. Id. § 6B.04(1), at 191 (“The guidelines shall have presumptive legal force in the
sentencing of individual offenders by sentencing courts, subject to judicial discretion to depart from
the guidelines as set forth in § 7.XX.”). Section 7.XX is one of a number of provisions not yet
officially adopted by the ALI. It states, inter alia, that judges may depart from the presumptive
guidelines provided they justify the decision in writing, subject to appellate confirmation that the
departure is justified by “substantial circumstances” in ordinary cases and by “extraordinary and
compelling circumstances” when the departure is more than twice the guidelines maximum. Id.
§ 7.XX, at 264–65.
66. Id. § 6B.04(4), at 193.
67. Id. § 6B.06(2)(a), at 211.
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are “jury sentencing facts” (which, under the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence, may be virtually all aggravators except prior convictions)68
must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.69 Third, alleged
criminal conduct that has not led to conviction may not form the basis of
an aggravator.70 Finally, neither aggravators nor mitigators may be used to
produce sentences that fall outside desert-based limits, a rule to be
enforced by the appellate courts.71
IV. THE COUNCIL DRAFT
The preliminary version of Tentative Draft No. 2 (called a Council
Draft because it is presented to the ALI Council and revised there prior to
full ALI review)72 rests on these building blocks. Its most controversial
proposal, albeit one that is not surprising in light of the 2003 Report and
Tentative Draft No. 1, is the abolition of back-end release decision-making
by parole boards.73 Instead, sentences are to be fixed at the front-end,
meaning that sentencing authority is to reside in the Commission as a
general matter and in trial judges and the appellate courts in specific cases.
The commentary for this proposal argues that, with few exceptions, the
trial court possesses all relevant dispositional information at the time of
sentencing.74 Relative desert, based on crimes already committed, can be
calibrated immediately after conviction and, given the static nature of most
risk and treatment factors, the need for incapacitation and the usefulness of
rehabilitation can also be measured at that time (assuming such
measurement is “reasonably feasible” at all).75
68. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 6 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 787 (3d ed. 2007) (noting the
Apprendi Court “held that regardless of how a fact is designated by a legislature, that fact must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury, if it is a fact other than prior conviction, and it
authorizes the imposition of a penalty that is more severe than the penalty authorized by law for the
offense of conviction alone”).
69. Tentative Draft No. 1 sets out a complex procedure for assuring Blakely’s stipulations are
met. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 7.07B, at 296–98 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
70. Id. § 6B.06(2)(b), (3), at 211–12. This limitation is meant to reject the “real offense”
sentencing that predominates in the federal system, a process that permits sentence enhancements
based on allegedly criminal conduct that was not prosecuted or was found not to be criminal by a
court. Id. at 217–20.
71. Id. at 201.
72. See Reitz, supra note 38, at 688.
73. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.10(1), at 51 (Council Draft No. 2, 2008).
74. Id. at 9–10 (noting that behavior in prison is seldom predictive of behavior once
released).
75. In further support of this position, the Council Draft includes a fascinating account of
research suggesting that (1) offenders released after determinate sentences are no less likely to be
“rehabilitated” than those subject to parole board release-decision-making; and (2) determinate,
guidelines-oriented systems are probably more likely to slow the growth of prison populations than
indeterminate regimes, perhaps because of the system-wide attention to resource allocation that
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Even if dramatic changes in the offender’s character or risk do
significantly alter the retributive or utilitarian analysis after sentence has
been imposed, the Council Draft permits these factors to reduce only the
lengthiest sentences (those that last more than fifteen years)76 and those
imposed on individuals who have since developed serious physical or
mental infirmities or become advanced in age.77 The Council Draft
recognizes only two other situations where sentences may be shortened
after they have been imposed, neither of which involves upsetting the trial
court’s sentencing judgment. Courts must grant credit for time already
served for the crime in question,78 and each sentence is automatically
reduced fifteen percent for “good behavior” unless the offender commits a
criminal offense or serious disciplinary infraction or “fails to participate
satisfactorily in work, education or other rehabilitation programs.”79
With respect to the precise length of the sentences, the Council Draft
suggests five categories of felonies (as compared to the old Code’s three
categories),80 with maxima of life, twenty years, ten years, five years and
three years, respectively.81 Post-release supervision is encouraged, but as
with the old Code, this supervision is to be imposed independently of
prison sentence rather than, as occurs in many parole regimes, incorporated
into sentence duration.82 This arrangement is designed to avoid the illogic
of visiting the longest post-release supervision on those who receive the
maximum suspension of sentence for good behavior and the shortest
supervision on those who deserve no such credit.83 The Council Draft also
prohibits mandatory minimum prison sentences84 on the ground that
judges, rather than legislatures, commissions, or prosecutors, should be the
ultimate arbiters of desert.85
A final aspect of the Council Draft worth mentioning given its
relevance to many of the articles in this Symposium is the role it assigns
risk assessments in the sentencing process. The Council Draft permits
sentencing commissions provide. Id. at 13–30.
76. Id. § 6.10A(1), at 58. As currently drafted, Section 6.10A(1) allows a judge to reduce or
terminate a sentence for an offender who has served at least fifteen years if the judge finds that
desert or incapacitative goals are no longer met by the original sentence. See also id. at 60.
However, Professor Reitz has indicated that the judicial component of this provision will be
eliminated and that the entire provision is likely to undergo substantial change in future revisions.
E-mail from Professor Reitz to Professor Slobogin, Feb. 13, 2009 (on file with author).
77. Id. § 6.10A(2), at 58.
78. Id. § 7.09, at 76.
79. Id. § 3.05.1(2), at 78.
80. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.01 (1962).
81. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.01(1), at 32 (Council Draft No. 2, 2008).
82. Id. § 6.10(2), at 51.
83. Id. § 6.10 cmt. d, at 52–53.
84. Id. § 3.05.6(6), at 85.
85. Id. § 6.06 cmt. c, at 39–40.
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sentencing commissions to construct presumptive guidelines that permit
low-risk felons to avoid prison entirely, assuming a non-prison term is not
too lenient under desert principles.86 Conversely, high-risk offenders may
be assigned enhanced sentences,87 although again desert determines the
outer limits of such sentences and the risk factors must be proven to a jury
in accordance with Blakely.88 To facilitate rational exercise of this risk
assessment authority, the Council Draft also directs the Commission to
develop and update instruments for needs and risk assessment and to
incorporate them into the Guidelines when they prove “sufficiently
reliable.”89
V. THE ARTICLES IN THIS SYMPOSIUM90
We are fortunate to have as the first contributor in this Symposium the
Reporter for the Model Penal Code sentencing project, Kevin Reitz, a law
professor at the University of Minnesota. After emphasizing the
importance of looking at the states (as opposed to the federal system) when
considering various reform routes, Professor Reitz’s article, Demographic
Impact Statements, O’Connor’s Warning, and the Mysteries of Prison
Release: Topics from a Sentencing Reform Agenda, focuses on three
aspects of the MPCS project: the demographic impact statement (DIS),
presumptive sentencing, and the extent to which sentences should be
determinate. Analogous to environmental or fiscal impact statements,
demographic impact statements under the MPCS would accompany each
sentencing proposal, and “[a]t a minimum . . . model the racial, ethnic, and
gender composition of future sentencing populations if the proposed
change in sentencing law were to take effect.”91 Although the DIS
requirement in Tentative Draft No.1 has not been controversial within the
ALI, only two states have a similar provision92 and the political risk
inherent in pointing out the differential racial impact of sentences could
create considerable resistance to this proposal. Nonetheless, Professor
Reitz makes a good case for the requirement and explores the types of
information and the possible impacts it might generate.93
86. Id. § 6B.09(3), at 62.
87. Id. § 6B.09 cmt. e, at 64–65.
88. Id. at 65.
89. Id. § 6B.09(1), at 62.
90. Douglas A. Berman, Kevin R. Reitz, Alice Ristroph, and Robert Weisberg presented a
version of their articles at a panel at the American Association of Law Schools in San Diego on
January 9, 2009, sponsored by the Criminal Justice and moderated by the author. Symposium,
Model Penal Code: Sentencing, 61 FLA. L. REV. 665 (2009). Nora V. Demleitner and Michael H.
Marcus did not present at the panel.
91. Reitz, supra note 38, at 690-91.
92. Minnesota’s Commission authorized the DIS in 2007. Id. at 693; see also IOWA CODE
§ 2.56(1) (West 2008).
93. Reitz, supra note 38, at 689–96.
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Professor Reitz then explains, in terms consistent with the above
discussion, why Tentative Draft No. 1 endorsed a presumptive sentencing
guidelines system rather than either an advisory guidelines approach (in
which departures from the guidelines range are not reviewable or only
perfunctorily so) or an entirely indeterminate regime.94 He also describes
various state reactions to Blakeley and Booker, all of which move away
from presumptive sentences.95 Agreeing with Justice O’Connor’s dissents
in these cases,96 Professor Reitz views these developments as unfortunate,
and hopes the MPCS project will provide an impetus in the opposite
direction.97 Finally, he notes that, despite Tentative Draft No. 1’s
preference for determinate sentences, the Council Draft does permit some
back-end adjustments (in the downward direction), most controversially
through its provision allowing modification of lengthy sentences.98 He
makes the case for the importance of this provision, especially given the
popularity of life without parole and long mandatory minima.99
The rest of the articles in this Symposium tend to be critical of the
MPCS project, especially its orientation toward desert. In The Enduring
(and Again Timely) Wisdom of the Original MPC Sentencing
Provisions,100 Professor Douglas Berman, Ohio State law professor and
indefatigable publisher of the Sentencing Law and Policy blog,101 calls the
MPCS project a “missed opportunity”102 because of its failure to address
directly the huge incarceration rates in this country, which dwarf those of
other Western countries and result in more imprisoned people in the U.S.
than in China.103 Professor Berman reminds us that the original Code and
even its updated commentaries (as late as 1979) made a strong statement
against imprisonment; the latter source asserts, for instance, that “[t]here is
no offense as to which imprisonment is absolutely required, except
possibly murder,”104 and makes clear that prisoners who are rehabilitated
should usually be released.105 Noting that the increase in incarceration and
94. Id. at 699.
95. Id. at 701–02.
96. In particular, see Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 314–26 (2004) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
97. Reitz, supra note 38, at 702–03.
98. Id. at 704–05.
99. Id. at 705–06.
100. See Douglas A. Berman, The Enduring (and Again Timely) Wisdom of the Original MPC
Sentencing Provisions, 61 FLA. L. REV. 709 (2009).
101. Sentencing Law and Policy, http://sentencing.typepad.com (last visited June 29, 2009).
102. Berman, supra note 100, at 709.
103. Id. at 711.
104. Introduction to Articles 6 and 7 to MODEL P ENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES: P ART I
§§ 6.01 to 7.09, at 8–9 (1985).
105. Id.
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extremely long sentences in this country coincided with the rejection of the
rehabilitative ideal,106 Berman fears that the MPCS’ adoption of limiting
retributivism and its goals of promoting determinate sentences and
eliminating parole boards will at best do nothing to reverse these trends,
and might even exacerbate them.107 While Berman concedes that the
expertise of sentencing commissions can lead to more rational policy
decisions, he is not optimistic that legislatures will listen to commissions
and is fearful that a system that focuses on defining sentence ranges at the
front-end according to desert is easily manipulated into producing
mandatory or increasingly harsher dispositions.108 In any event, he
suggests, without the moderating effect of parole decision-making at the
back-end, even a sentencing regime created by a progressive commission
will be unable to take into account the myriad of mitigating factors that
should lead to early release.109
Seton Hall Law Professor Alice Ristroph, in How (Not) to Think Like a
Punisher,110 likewise expresses skepticism about the new Code’s adoption
of retributivism as a guiding philosophy.111 To her, sentencing is first and
foremost a political statement about state power; its role as a device for
punishing offenders is secondary. Thus, fashioning sentences around desert
principles (or on any other theory of punishment) is short-sighted.112 She
notes that the new Code seems to recognize this point in its provisions
calling for fiscal and demographic impact statements, evidence-based
sentencing, uniformity and parsimony, none of which are necessarily tied
to retribution or other theories of punishment.113 However, she also argues
that the Code’s focus on limiting retributivism means that sentencing
commissions, trial judges, and appellate judges may have to make
decisions that are in tension with these intended limitations on state
power.114 Once it is determined that an offender deserves a particular
sentence or sentence range, considerations such as cost, racial disparities,
offender risk and other non-desert variables are much harder to integrate
into the decision.115 As Ristroph notes,
[A] moral claim that an offender deserves ten years in prison
is not affected by the fact that the state cannot afford to
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Berman, supra note 100, at 715.
Id. at 721.
Id. at 722–23.
Id. at 724–25.
Alice Ristroph, How (Not) to Think Like a Punisher, 61 FLA. L. REV. 727 (2009).
See id. at 727–28.
Id. at 728.
Id. at 729.
Id. at 744–45.
Id. at 746–49.
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support him, or that the offender’s incarceration will further
exacerbate racial disproportions in the prison
population . . . . The danger of desert is that it preserves the
possibility that some will say the costs are worth it, the
inequities deserved.116
Finally, Ristroph argues that this tension between the retributive theory
of punishment and more practical, evidence-based goals is exacerbated by
desert’s elasticity; claims of desert are not “falsifiable” in the same way
these practical claims are.117 Indeed, the public arguably has as much
expertise as judges in deciding how much punishment is proportionate to
offense gravity.118 If judges have expertise about proportionality, Ristroph
suggests, it is not with respect to desert, but rather in terms of balancing all
of the foregoing considerations against the government’s contention that an
offender should be deprived of liberty.119
Michael H. Marcus, an Oregon state trial judge who has championed
“smart sentencing” focused on promoting public safety,120 expresses even
greater concerns about the retributive cast of the new Code in his article,
MPC—The Root of the Problem: Just Deserts and Risk Assessment.121
Disagreeing with the Code’s unwillingness to accord significant weight to
risk differentials except in extreme cases, Judge Marcus believes that risk
assessments should heavily influence all sentences.122 He argues that,
despite their inevitable uncertainty, such assessments would not create
“false positives” because they would merely allocate where offenders end
up—in prison or in the community—not whether they should be
punished.123 Furthermore, like Ristroph, he considers determinations of
desert to be at least as unstable as assessments of risk.124
More fundamentally, Judge Marcus sees no point in basing the typical
sentence on desert unless doing so enhances public safety.125 Often the two
considerations are at odds, not just because a dangerous person might not
be blameworthy (or vice versa), but because characteristics that appear
mitigating—youth, addiction, impaired functioning—are frequently risk
116. Id. at 746–48.
117. Id. at 748.
118. Id. at 740.
119. Id. at 745.
120. See Michael H. Marcus, Future Trends in State Courts 2006: Smart Sentencing: Public
Safety, Public Trust and Confidence Through Evidence-Based Dispositions, TRENDS (2006),
available at http://sentencing.nj.gov/downloads/pdf/articles/2006/Oct2006/document05.pdf.
121. See Michael H. Marcus, MPC—The Root of the Problem: Just Deserts and Risk
Assessment, 61 FLA. L. REV. 751, 751–52 (2009).
122. Id. at 756.
123. Id. at 754–55.
124. Id. at 753–54.
125. Id. at 752.
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factors.126 Judge Marcus concedes that the imperatives of desert and public
safety might overlap when bucking the public’s desire for retribution
would lead to vigilantism or disrespect for and non-compliance with the
system, but he asserts that before sentences are affected by such
considerations there must be concrete demonstration of their impact,
especially if sentence ranges, like those imposed under the new Code,
purport to be “evidence-based.”127 In any event, Judge Marcus argues, any
public dissatisfaction with the criminal law that does occur most likely
stems from the perception that it is failing to protect the public.128 For
Judge Marcus, only in a small subset of cases—perhaps, for instance, a
homicide committed by a one-time drunk driver—should desert concerns
trump a public safety orientation at sentencing.129
In her article, Good Conduct Time: How Much and For Whom?: The
Unprincipled Approach of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing,130 Professor
Nora V. Demleitner, Dean at Hofstra Law School, more gently chastises
the MPCS project. Her article focuses on the MPCS’ position on good time
credits (which is considerably less generous than the old Code).131 She
notes that such credits can dramatically increase participation in
rehabilitation programs, provide incentives to cooperate with prison
authorities, and give prisoners reason to believe they control their fate at
least to some extent, thus enhancing their “ability to operate as
independent actors.”132 Accordingly, she advocates good time credits of up
to one-third of the sentence, with a 15% reduction for good conduct and
the remainder granted for satisfactory participation in rehabilitation
programs, all of which should be non-revocable (in contrast to the rule in
every state).133 She also admits, however, that the crediting process needs
greater transparency and clearer criteria.134
Finally, the article by Stanford Law Professor Robert Weisberg, entitled
Tragedy, Skepticism, Empirics, and the MPCS,135 proffers a “tragic” but
126. Id. at 768–69.
127. Id. at 771–72.
128. Id. at 764–65.
129. Id. at 775.
130. Nora V. Demleitner, Good Conduct Time: How Much and For Whom?: The
Unprincipled Approach of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing, 61 FLA. L. REV. 777 (2009).
131. Id. at 779–80. As noted above, the MPCS would automatically grant a 15% reduction
unless misconduct occurs. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. The old Code automatically
reduced sentence by at least 20% and in cases of exceptional performance by another 20%. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 305.1 (1962).
132. Demleitner, supra note 130, at 794-95.
133. Id. at 790, 795-96.
134. Id. at 795-96.
135. Robert Weisberg, Tragedy, Skepticism, Empirics, and the MPCS, 60 FLA. L. REV. 797
(2009).
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ultimately optimistic view of our ability to resolve the kinds of issues
raised in the foregoing articles. He notes that, while the MPCS calls for
evidence-based sentencing, it does not directly address how we are to
determine whether the sentences it produces enhance public safety, save
taxpayer money, or reduce prison populations.136 For instance, he asks,
how can we tell whether judges at the front-end are better than parole
boards at the back-end at judging risk and rehabilitation?137 And how do
we decide whether determinate sentencing is more likely than
indeterminate sentencing to increase prison populations?138 The MPCS
commentary presents some statistics suggesting that judges and
determinate sentencing are no worse than parole boards and indeterminate
sentencing in these respects.139 But, relying in large part on Frank
Zimring’s work,140 Professor Weisberg shows that most attempts to
provide even approximately concrete answers to questions about whether
particular criminal justice policies have any effect founder on intractable
methodological and conceptual conundrums.141
So, Professor Weisberg suggests, policy that rests on empirical
foundations may depend on how we assign the burden of proof.142 And
perhaps the burden should be particularly high when, as with sentencing
reform, the research results encourage significant structural change that
would be implemented by legislators, who are often not adverse to grandstanding.143 In the meantime, Professor Weisberg suggests, we might want
to consider a number of modest empirical projects—focusing on relatively
simple ways of measuring crime and recidivism rates, racial and ethnic
disparity, imprisonment costs, and public “satisfaction” with criminal
justice—that could incrementally provide us with relevant information and
make us feel more comfortable about attempting evidence-based decisions
in the sentencing context.144
These thought-provoking articles should stimulate debate within the
ALI, academia, and the public at large. As the introduction to Tentative
Draft No. 1 states, sentencing is by far the most important criminal justice
issue.145 I, like many of the authors in this Symposium, am suspicious of a
136. Id. at 813-23.
137. Id. at 800, 812.
138. Id. at 802-03.
139. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
140. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 195–207 (2007). See
generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT (1991)
(discussing the role and impact of imprisonment in criminal sentencing).
141. Weisberg, supra note 135, at 802-04.
142. Id. at 811.
143. Id. at 812.
144. Id. at 817-25.
145. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum xxviii
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sentencing regime that focuses on desert.146 I am also not as sanguine as
the ALI that risk and needs assessments are better made at trial than on an
on-going basis.147 But the MPCS by no means goes all the way down the
retributive road, and its basic structure provides a framework for a wide
array of compromises that could work politically and conceptually. For
instance, as noted above, the MPCS would allow non-prison sentences for
low risk offenders and enhanced sentences for high risk offenders.148
Implicit in these provisions is the assumption that both sentencing
commissions and appellate courts should recognize that our “moral
calipers” are very flexible, and thus should give trial judges substantial
discretion to implement utilitarian objectives. The MPCS is also willing to
countenance development of a calculus for equating community sanctions
and treatment programs with prison time,149 which would increase the
possibility that the latter disposition becomes the exception rather than the
rule, and would, in effect, make treatment providers, monitored by judges,
key decision-makers. No sentencing regime will come close to achieving
all the goals we would like, but the MPCS project, to date, has not
foreclosed pursuing any of them. The articles in this Symposium provide a
good platform for considering the many options still open to the ALI in its
revision of the Model Penal Code’s sentencing provisions.

(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
146. See generally CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE
WITH MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 152–77 (2006) (discussing feasibility of a
preventive system of justice). See also Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law,
58 VAND. L. REV. 121, 129–44 (2005) (same).
147. The claim that most risk factors are static is inaccurate. Ten of the twenty items on the
HCR-20, a highly regarded structured risk assessment instrument, involve non-historical
characteristics. See Kevin S. Douglas & Christopher D. Webster, The HCR-20 Violence Risk
Assessment Scheme: Concurrent Validity in a Sample of Incarcerated Offenders, 26 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 3, 8 (1999). Moreover, if, as should often be the case, disposition involves the community
rather than prison, dynamic risk factors can be evaluated in an ecologically valid way.
148. See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text.
149. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(b)(iv), at 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007)
(encouraging intermediate sanctions); id. § 6A.06, at 129 (requiring development of a “community
corrections strategy”); id. § 6B.02(6), at 159 (guidelines must address community sanctions).
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